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Abstract. Recent trends show an increase in risks for personal cyberattacks, in part
due to an increase in remote work that has been imposed by worldwide Covid-19 lock-
downs. These attacks have further exposed the inefficiencies of the paternalistic design
of Internet security systems and security configuration frameworks. Prior research has
shown that users often have inadequate Internet security and privacy mental models.
However, little is known about the causes of flawed mental models. Using mixed methods
over a period of nine months, we investigate Internet security mental models of users
in Africa and the implications of these mental models on personal security practice.
Consistent with prior research, we find inadequate Internet security mental models in
self-reported expert and non-expert Internet users. In addition, our mental modelling
and task analysis reveal that the flawed security practice does not only result from
users’ negligence, but also from lack of sufficient Internet security knowledge. Our find-
ings motivate for reinforcing users’ Internet security mental models through personalised
security configuration frameworks to allow users, especially those with limited technical
skills, to easily configure their desired security levels.
Keywords: usable security · security mental models · Internet security · privacy
1 Introduction
Over the years, improving end-users security has proven to be a challenging task. Generally,
users perceive security as a secondary task that they must complete before performing a
more relevant primary task. Such mental models hinder the acceptance of security awareness
initiatives and inhibit users’ perception and adoption of security [12]. A mental model is defined
as “psychological representations of real, hypothetical, or imaginary situations.” [9]. Research
has shown that users have incomplete or vague information on security mechanisms, systems,
the Internet, and information flow in many circumstances[23]. Recent cybersecurity trends
reveal a huge increase in cyberattacks targetting both enterprises and individuals [36]. The
COVID-19 pandemic has forced the remote workforce increasing the risks of online attacks on
personal devices. This influx of attacks has revealed how unprepared users are to combat these
attacks.
The “partenalistic” or “stupid user” [2, 38] design of Internet security systems has not pre-
pared users to have proper mental models about Internet security protocols and configuration
frameworks. As a result, users have remained the weakest link in the security ecosystem. Cranor
and Garfinkel [12] report that security is taken as a “by the way” by many users, while other
users perceive security mechanisms as an annoyance. Other studies attribute these security
perceptions to lack of security awareness and propose interventions to instil a security culture
in Internet users and to engage them in security decision-making [1, 2, 10]. Despite these in-
terventions, many users keep making suboptimal security decisions. We argue that the current
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implementation of Internet security services leaves users, especially those with limited comput-
ing skills, out of the security decision-making process. This is because security configuration
parameters are often specialised, hidden from the user, or the security decisions are imple-
mented in a top-down fashion where those with power (e.g. Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
content providers) make security decisions on behalf of users. This pyramidal implementation
of Internet security services often disregards user security and privacy preferences. As a result,
many users do not develop proper mental models of Internet security and consequently fail
to configure the required security level to meet the required protection. Mental models with
negative consequences include an erroneous understanding of the Internet structure, the flow,
security and storage of their online information [23, 29].
Usable Internet security research reports that users with technical skills exhibit better
mental models of the Internet. For example, a study conducted by Kang et al. [23] found
that users with technical knowledge had more articulate mental models of the Internet. In
contrast, those with little technical knowledge displayed simple Internet models. Despite these
differences, the authors did not find a direct relationship between people’s technical background
and their actions to control their privacy or increase their security online. However, their
work does not investigate why users have disparities between mental models and security
practices. Understanding the reasons behind users’ flawed security mental models is important
in ensuring that usable online security solutions are designed to accommodate varying technical
skill levels. This study investigates the factors that influence users’ security and privacy mental
models and practice. Drawing from Internet users in Africa, our work tries to explain the
relationship between users’ computing skill levels, general Internet mental models, Internet
security models, and practice. Developing regions, such as Africa, have seen rapid Internet
penetration over recent years, which has provided risks for different kinds of online attacks.
Therefore, understanding personal security readiness is fundamental to ensuring that proper
security tools are developed that reinforce users’ Internet security mental models. Specifically,
we aim to answer the following questions:
1. What is the relationship between users’ computing skills levels, security knowledge, security
preferences and Internet security practice?
2. What mental models of the Internet and online security do users have?
3. Which mental models interfere with secure and private Internet usage?
The contribution of our work is three-fold; first, we use a comprehensive mixed-methods
(survey, open-ended questionnaire, mental modelling and task analysis) user study with par-
ticipants drawn from the understudied African Internet userbase. Using individual methods,
prior research has focused much on the developed regions where the Internet is developed.
Secondly, our work provides further evidence that flawed mental models and poor online secu-
rity practice are also caused by insufficient Internet security knowledge. Our findings suggest
that the inadequate security mental models are exacerbated by delegated or ”stupid user”
implementation of Internet security services, which advocate for expert-friendly security con-
figuration services. Finally, concurring with prior research, our study identifies generally weak
explainable relationships between users technical knowledge, Internet security mental models
and their security practice. We provide insight into how these relationships can be strengthened
to reinforce users’ security mental models and their online security practice.
2 Related Work
Three areas of usable security research are essential to our work: i) studies on users security
preferences, ii) studies on human in the security loop and iii) studies on security education.
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2.1 Usable security
Security is ordinarily defined as a collection of all measures to prevent loss of any kind. The
concept of security is as old as humankind and peoples’ physical safety, and their possessions
have always been at risk from a deliberate attack or accidental damage [33]. The increased user
base on the Internet and other digital platforms imply that peoples’ physical and digital assets
are at risk [12]. Decades ago, access to the Internet and online communication was a corporate
privilege due to the high cost of access devices and data services. On the contrary, recently,
we have witnessed a surge in the uptake of ICT-enabled services and Internet access from de-
veloping regions. To meet the increasing demand for online security, the research communities
and the IT industry have developed many security mechanisms and theories to counter digital
attacks. Despite these interventions, online exploitation and security breaches of businesses,
governments, and individual Internet users keep blossoming [26]. Cranor and Garfinkel [12]
reported that security mechanisms are mostly too obscure for users to comprehend, i.e., not
usable. Whitten and Tygar [41] reported in their work that there exists an antagonism be-
tween security and usability, exposing mutual trade-offs between these properties. A common
opinion is that users should sacrifice usability to achieve sufficient security [11]. On the other
hand, Fagan and Khan [15] found that users, despite being aware of existing dangers, often
put usability before security, exposing themselves to many risks.
2.2 Human in/out of-the-loop philosophies
Over the years, many usable security variants have emerged. They can be classified as a human
in the loop [16], and human out-of-loop [14, 34]. These philosophies continue to shape usable
security research. With the notion that humans are the weakest link in the security chain,
some security mechanisms are fully automated and do not include humans [16]. This kind of
security design is known as a paternalistic approach or Human-out-of-the-loop[2, 8, 27]. The
paternalistic security research paradigm reports that automated systems are generally more
accurate and predictable than humans and that automated systems do not get tired or get
bored [16, 38].
Although some paternalistic security systems work, other variants of Usable Security re-
search report that these systems can be too restrictive, inconvenient, expensive, or slow in some
cases. Edwards [14] argue that it is unreasonable to automate all privacy and security man-
agement decisions due to numerous technical and social factors that limit such automation’s
efficacy and acceptance. This line of thought supports two approaches to involving humans in
decision making: strict libertarian and soft paternalistic that require users to be involved in
security decision-making [19]. Historically, these approaches do not guarantee that users will
make competent security decisions due to human limitations resulting from inexperience and
cognitive limitations, among others [2].
2.3 User’s Internet and Internet security mental models
The mental modelling approach is becoming more common in usable security research. It is
used to understand users’ perception of the Internet, Information and Communication Tech-
nologies (ICTs), and Internet-related systems such as cybersecurity [5, 10, 20, 25, 37, 38, 39],
Mobile App security and privacy [28], online banking and Internet of Things (IoT). The mental
models are regarded as an important framework for describing user behaviour [31].
Renaud et al. [32] investigated the reasons why users do not implement email security. In
their work, they argued that the non-adoption of end-to-end encryption might not be entirely
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due to usability issues as reported by Whitten and Tygar [41]. Instead, they found incomplete
threat models, misaligned incentives, and a general absence of understanding of the email
architecture as some of the factors contributing to the non-adoption of security. Their research
proposed building more comprehensive end-user mental models related to email and email
security. This is counter-intuitive to the Paternalistic or ’stupid user’ approaches that assume
that security is too complicated for average users to comprehend and try to implement security
mechanisms for the users. Asgharpour et al. [5] evaluated expert and näıve mental models of
computer security and found that the models differed with expertise. They also found that
security models in the form of common metaphors (e.g. viruses, zombies, or keys) did not
reconcile well with understanding in either group.
The definition of an expert user differs among different studies. For example, Bravo-Lillo
et al. [7] defines expert users as having taken a graduate-level security course or worked for at
least a year in the field; while Ion et al. [20] define a security expert as having a minimum of
five years of experience. In their work, Bravo-Lillo et al. [7] reported a difference in how expert
and novice users interpreted the context of security warnings. Similarly, Ion et al. [20] observed
differing security preferences between experts and novices. A recent study by Krombholz et al.
[25] assessed HTTPS mental models of both end-users and administrators and found that
misconceptions about security benefits and threat models existed in both groups. In particular,
they found that end-user mental models are more conceptual, while administrator models are
protocol-based.
In summary, prior research has shown that users of ICTs have poorer security mental
models leading to a more inadequate online security culture. Complementing prior research,
our study investigates the factors that lead to the flawed mental models. We focus on identifying
hurdles users face when interacting with the Internet security configuration frameworks such
as web security, DNS, VPN and web filtering configuration tools. Africa has seen a surge in
the Internet user base over the last ten years. However, security research has focused much on
American and European Internet users. Thus, our study focuses on Africa to understand the
human element of security and privacy.
3 Methodology
This study uses a mixed-methods approach in a multi-stage approach to obtain an in-depth
understanding and explanation of users’ Internet security culture. We begin with a close-ended,
exploratory baseline online survey to get an insight into Internet users’ knowledge, preference,
usage and perception of Internet security and security configuration tools found in Internet
access platforms commonly used. We follow up the online survey with an open-ended ques-
tionnaire. To alleviate limitations of self-reported responses [13, 40], we run user experiments
(mental modelling and tasks analysis) based on our online survey and questionnaire results.
Finally, we complement the user experiments with iterative follow-up interviews. We required
the participants to be active Internet users, primarily based in Africa. The African population
is particularly of interest because most Usable Security research has focused on North Ameri-
can and European populations, even though the number of internet users in Africa has grown
at the fastest rate in recent years. The surge in the Internet user base has significantly been
accelerated by smartphone uptake and social network platforms. In the following subsections,
we describe the study design in detail.
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3.1 Quantitative Study (Online Survey)
The exploratory survey’s primary aim was to get a general insight into the relationship between
users’ computing skill levels and their knowledge of the Internet and online security. It also
aimed to explore the general online security practice of users. In addition to questions about
computer knowledge, we included questions that enabled us to categorise participants into
expert and non-expert categories. Following the principle of cognitive interviews [30], we pre-
tested the survey to identify and correct all the ambiguities. Participants were asked to provide
their honest opinions, which we used to fine-tune the questions iteratively. We pre-tested
(n = 30) the survey internally with our research group members and other colleagues and
friends until a satisfactory convergence was reached.
Recruitment and Inclusion Criteria Study participants were recruited through social
media, personal contacts and professional mailing lists. The aim of using diverse sources was
to capture a representative sample among Internet users in Africa and to include participants
with different levels of computing skills. We posted the invitation (in English) on LinkedIn,
Twitter, WhatsApp groups, and African Network Operators Groups’ (NOG) mailing lists.
A total of 298 responded to the survey. However, our quantitative evaluation only considers
the responses of 240 participants who completed all the questions in the survey. These partici-
pants represent a diversity of self-reported computing skills, ranging from basic, intermediate,
advanced and expert. We structured the survey to allow participants to provide their general
and personal picture of Internet security mechanisms and preferences. The survey had five
sections; Internet access and usage, Internet security knowledge, Internet Security preferences
and Demographics.
3.2 Qualitative Study
Self-reported studies suffer various biases, including over-reporting and under-reporting [13,
40]. To alleviate this problem, we used the survey to recruit participants for subsequent follow-
up studies. A total of 155 participants agreed to be included in our follow-up studies. We sent
out an online open-ended questionnaire to these 155 participants, of which 60 participants
completed the questionnaire. We also recruited 32 individuals to participate in the mental
modelling and task analysis activities.
Open-ended Questionnaire We designed an online questionnaire to validate the partici-
pants’ self-reported technical skills and to uncover further details that would have been missed
during the exploratory survey, such as the level of familiarity with Internet security proto-
cols and concepts. The questionnaire was also used to recruit participants for the interactive
sessions.
Mental modeling The exploratory surveys provided some insight into participants’ Internet
and security mental models. However, self-reported responses do suffer over-reporting biases
[13, 40]. To qualify the survey responses, we tested participants’ knowledge of Internet infras-
tructure and its security features. Gentner and Stevens [17] has shown that users act in line
with their mental models of a phenomenon. We therefore gave drawing tasks to participants,
following a methodology employed by Kang et al. [23]. We first asked participants to draw the
Internet and its components. To put the tasks into perspective, we asked participants to draw
the processes of sending an email and making an online payment. These tasks were identified as
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most common (See Figure 4) and were mostly rated as critical and requiring strict security and
privacy (See Figure 2). We asked the participants to label the direction of information flow and
to identify entities that would have access to user data. Participants were further encouraged
to identify vantage points that require security and describe the kind of security required. We
encouraged participants to verbalise their thought process in line with think-aloud protocols
[6, 21].
Task analysis We undertook a task analysis exercise where we asked participants to configure
security using tools available in their preferred Internet access platforms, such as operating
systems, web browsers and mobile applications. The aim was to investigate how users’ mental
models interfere with the security practice of participants. We also aimed to identify factors
that influence security mental models and practice. The task analysis session was also used to
validate self-reported studies and mental models. We used lab experiments and online video
conferencing sessions using Zoom to observe the participants do the configuration tasks.
We specifically asked the participants to take us through their usual way of configuring
security or privacy on their preferred Internet access platform. This was necessary to allow
the participants to demonstrate their mental models without an imposed configuration type.
We then asked the participants to configure security and privacy in their preferred browser.
We decided to use a browser-based security configuration because it was the platform most
highly ranked by participants in the exploratory survey. In addition, we asked the participants
to demonstrate how they would block ads, phishing sites and adult content. We also asked the
participants whether they knew how to configure DNS and asked them to demonstrate how
they would configure secure DNS protocols. We chose DNS because it is a more straightforward
protocol that can be implemented at the endpoint. Also, DNS has been exploited recently,
exposing the user to unwanted content and poor QoE.
We video-recorded the drawing and configuration sessions with participants’ permission
without capturing any participants’ identifying information. Each recording was assigned a
unique random code for easy referencing in this paper. Throughout the process, we were able
to go back to the participants for clarification interviews. These iterative interviews allowed
us to identify emerging concepts and their relationships. We carried out the interviews until
we reached the saturation of the theoretical constructs.
3.3 Data analysis
We used non-parametric statistical tests (Chi-square (χ̃2(DF )), Cramer’s Phi (φC , Correlation)
and Likelihood ratio) to analyse the quantitive results. We mainly looked for the relationship
between computing skills and participants’ perception, knowledge and practice of Internet
security configuration. We iteratively analysed the qualitative data using content and narrative
analysis methods. We transcribed the results verbatim and coded the data with the aid of
NVivo12 software 1. The initial coding was done independently between two researchers and
compared and sorted at a research meeting. We then looked for patterns, connections and
relationships among the codes and assigned them to more high-level predefined categories.
Throughout the process, we could go back to the participants to seek clarification on emerging
themes. This iteration continued until we reached saturation. Finally, we organised the themes
into a relationships model to answer our research questions 2 and 3.
1 https://www.qsrinternational.com/nvivo-qualitative-data-analysis-software/home
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4 Results
Our results show that, generally, users with better computing skills have better Internet mental
models. To a considerable extent, we observe that better Internet mental models imply stricter
security and privacy requirements. However, we note that stricter security requirements do
not imply better self vulnerability assessment or better security practice. We observe that
expert users with security experience had better mental models for both the Internet and
security. We find that, among other factors, lack of proper knowledge of Internet security
and its configuration frameworks is the leading cause of flawed security practice among many
participants.
4.1 Online Survey Results
Demographics: Table 1 shows demographics for survey participants, identified predomi-
nantly as male at 82.92%, followed by females at 15%. We attribute this to the divide between
males and females in terms of Internet usage or technology usage in general [3, 4, 7, 22]. Figure
1 shows the countries of residence for our survey participants. In terms of educational level,
participants identified overwhelmingly as tertiary institutions graduates (97.08%). The sur-
vey targeted participants who use the Internet regardless of educational background; hence,
we focus more on participants’ computing skill levels (Fundamentals (0.42%), Basic (8.33%),
Intermediate (20.83%), Advanced (34.17%) and Expert (36.25%).
Demographic
Gender
Male 199 (82.92 %)
Female 38 (15.83%)
Transgender 1 (0.42%)






Expert (Systems /network administration and security, Programming, e.t.c) 87 (36.25%)
Advanced (Internet, Email, Office applications, Databases, Programming) 82 (34.17%)
Intermediate (Internet, Email, Office applications, databases) 50 (20.83%)
Basic (Internet, Email, Office applications (Word, Spreadsheet, PowerPoint) 20 (8.33%)
Fundamentals (Internet,Typing) 1 (0.42%)
Table 1: Survey participants’ demographics
Internet Access and Use: To understand the participants’ Internet use, we asked them to
choose from a list of use categories. Figure 4 shows a stacked bar chart for the internet use
frequencies. The seven most common uses are productivity/office, communication, information
search, social networking, entertainment, e-Financial services and virtual meetings. Comparing
levels of computing skills and internet usage, we find a statistically significant relationship only
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Fig. 1: Participants’ country Fig. 2: Participants’ concerns on security and
privacy attacks
on two uses; e-Services (χ̃2(4) : 9.847, LR : 10.904, φC : 0.203, p = 0.043) and Productivity
(χ̃2(4) : 16.002, LR : 14.307, φC : 0.258, p = 0.003). Overall, this suggests no major differences
in how users use the Internet, whether one is an expert or not. The results further show that
participants mostly use smartphones, laptops, desktops, tablet computers, and Kindle devices
(See Figure 3). We found that many participants access the Internet via mobile broadband
(≈ 58%) followed by office network (≈ 25%) using web browsers and mobile apps installed
on their smartphones and laptops. We consider this information useful for designing usable
security interventions.
Our results show that the Internet is a significant part of participants’ daily lives, with
over 78% of them reporting to access the Internet for over four (4) hours daily.
Fig. 3: The devices that participants use to ac-
cess the Internet
Fig. 4: What participants indicated they use the
Internet for
Users’ Internet security knowledge and preference: The study further sought to un-
derstand participants’ Internet security configuration and preferences. We asked a series of
questions, including VPN usage, and priority ranking between convenience and performance,
security, privacy, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We also asked them about what
they would consider an ideal security configuration tool. The follow-up questions particularly
aimed to solicit ideas on what users deem useful information that an ideal security config-
uration tool should provide. We find that 94 (39.17%) of the participants indicate to have
used VPN. Among the reasons for using VPN, participants indicated the need for enhanced
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privacy/security, remote access, bypassing censorship, and accessing geo-restricted content.
We find a statistically significant relationship between computing skill level and VPN usage
(χ̃2(4) : 42.428, LR : 45.699, φC : 0.420, p < 0.001), gender and VPN usage (χ̃
2
(3) : 24.432,
LR : 30.943, φC : 0.319, p < 0.001).
We asked participants to indicate their level of concern for their online safety and pri-
vacy, such as pervasive monitoring, unsolicited emails, and unwanted adverts. Most of the
participants (40.43%) indicated that they were very concerned (they feel vulnerable), 30.43%
indicated that they were concerned, (17.83%) were somewhat concerned, 6.96% were not con-
cerned at all and finally, 4.35% indicated that they knew they should be concerned, but they
chose not to be concerned. The participants were further asked to rank their security, conve-
nience, and performance preferences during any browsing session. We asked this question in
three ways to ensure that users are not coerced by order of the items or question phrasing.
Firstly, we just asked for ranking according to preference with which they ranked security,
performance, and convenience, respectively. After some questions, we asked participants to
indicate which of the three (security, performance, and convenience) they would compromise
if their connection was vulnerable to attacks and, secondly, if their network was slow. In both
scenarios, participants indicated that they would rather compromise convenience and perfor-
mance. In all three cases, participants indicated taking security seriously, even if it meant
trading off with performance and convenience. In addition to these three options, we asked
participants to rank security confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Privacy according to
their preference. Generally, these three security goals are achieved using different mechanisms
that impact performance differently. Therefore this question solicited the most preferred goal.
This could inform the design of security mechanisms by highlighting which security mecha-
nisms must be available to the users and which ones can be optional. We provided definitions
of these concepts in advance to ensure that the participants could make an informed ranking
decision. The results indicate confidentiality, privacy, availability and integrity as the general
preference order.
We required the participants to indicate whether they knew of security configuration tools
available in their Internet access platforms. A majority 143(59.6%) indicated that they were of
such. Of those, 120 indicated to have ever configured security using these configuration tools.
Finally, of those participants who indicated to have ever configured Internet security using the
available tool, over 70% found the tools to be simple enough. The rest reported that the tools
were either difficult to use or confusing. We asked the participants how they wished the tools
improved. Among other features, the participants indicated correct information on the tools’
interface, including security information of their browsing session, the performance impact of
their security configuration, and general connection information.
What and how information should be protected? To determine what kind of informa-
tion participants would keenly consider protecting online, we asked the participants to indicate
the level of importance for each asset requiring protection. Figure 5 shows a Likert plot for
eight different digital assets. We observe that for most of the assets, the responses are skewed
towards the critical side of the scale. Of the eight sample digital assets tested, online banking,
passwords, data and identity were rated Very critical by at least 70% of the participants.
Except for news content and browsing history, we observe that over 96% of participants rate
the digital assets as critical. The lowest is news content. This implies that not all digital assets
are the same, and hence protection requirements will differ. Given an option to define intent
and its associated costs, users may protect one asset and not the other.
In addition to the digital assets, we asked participants to indicate the level of agreement
to seven statements about their online security and privacy preferences. Figure 6 shows Likert











 Please indicate how critical  the following items are to you such that you are likely to protect them for you to stay safe online:
Legend Not critical at all Not that critical Neutral Critical Very critical
Fig. 5: Criticality of participants’ digital assets that require protection
plot for the seven statements, where we observe that over 90% of the participants indicated
they prefer to browse confidentially and anonymously. Over 65% of the participants strongly
agreed that users should control their security and privacy online using simple Internet secu-
rity configuration tools capable of keeping the user informed of the security or performance
impact of their security configuration. Surprisingly, we observe that ≈ 75% of the participants
agree that ISPs ought to be able to monitor users’ browsing activities. This contradicts the
requirement to browse anonymously.
4.2 Qualitative Analysis
This section presents results from the three qualitative studies we conducted; open-ended
questionnaire, mental models drawing exercises, and security configuration task analysis. The
task analysis method was used to validate the claims and observations made in the quantitative
studies and in mental modelling.
Internet and security mental models The Internet mental models described by partici-
pants varied substantially across computing skill levels. We observe that increase in computing
skill level comes with an increase in complexity and clarity of models, which we classify into
simple, moderate, and complex or representative models. For example, participants with basic
and intermediate computing skills presented the Internet as a central node represented with
a rectangle, cloud, globe or a big server (See Figure 7). Other participants’ models of the
Internet included big technology companies, such as Google and Facebook. One participant
(P0044) said “I really don’t know, but the possible structure could be the Website like Google”.
To such a class of participants, the Internet is pretty much defined by the applications they
use. Figure 8 shows one of the simplistic views of the Internet drawn by a participant. On one
extreme, the experts displayed a complete understanding of the Internet, mentioning underly-
ing telecommunication structure, applications, protocols, and standards (See Figure 9). Due to
space limitations, we present users’ Internet models using a code frequency graph in Figure 7.
We observe that to many participants, the Internet model is the communication infrastructure
represented by a green bar in Figure 7. Advanced and expert users also mentioned technical
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 Please indicate your agreement/disagreement with each of the following statements.
Legend Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
Fig. 6: Agreement/Disagreement to security and privacy statements. Refer to the following key
for statements:
Statement 1 - I ought to be able to communicate over the Internet without people being able
to read/access the content.
Statement 2 - I ought to be able to take on different aliases/roles at various times on the
Internet.
Statement 3 - I value being able to visit websites on the Internet in an anonymous manner.
Statement 4 - Internet Service Providers ought to monitor Internet user’s browsing activity
Statement 5 - There ought to be more straightforward Internet security configuration tools to
protect one’s privacy on the internet.
Statement 6 - Users ought to have complete control over which websites/Apps get personal
information.
Statement 7 - Users should be informed of the possible security/performance impact of one’s
security configuration.
and web standards and end-users as being part of the Internet structure. We identified similar
patterns in the email and online payment drawings.
The study asked the participants to explain the risks associated with Internet browsing.
Many participants mentioned hackers, password and information theft, among others. However,
many non-expert participants failed to explain how they mitigated against the mentioned risks.
This was contrary to the quantitative study results where many participants responded that
they were very concerned (see Figure 2) about their security and that they configure security
on their Internet access devices. Expert participants mentioned advanced measures such as
VPN, encryption, incognito and third-party plugins.
Impact of Mental models on Security Practice The second interactive activity was
the task analysis experiment. In this experiment, we observed participants as they configured
security in response to three questions about online privacy, browser/app security and DNS
security. We designed the questions based on responses given in the two surveys and the
drawing exercises. In all tasks, we observed that participants with little to moderate computing
skills had a vague idea of Internet security. Most of the participants in these categories referred
to passwords and antivirus as their primary means of security. For example, one participant
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Fig. 7: Code frequency for the internet mental model
Fig. 8: Simplistic structure of the Internet Fig. 9: A more detailed structure of the Internet
(P0039) said, “I feel very secure because I use a personal laptop which is secured with a password
and an antivirus.”
Observing how participants went about configuring security, we noted that many non-
expert participants did not know the Internet security configuration frameworks. For example,
others were quick to admit that they did not know Internet security configuration tools, and
therefore, they did not customise security on their Internet access platforms. When we followed
up on what they thought Internet security was and why they had indicated that they had ever
configured security, many referred to passwords and phone locking mechanisms as security
measures. We demonstrated some of the configurations to such participants and asked them
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to repeat the configurations. Finally, we asked them to describe the difficulty level for the
procedure. Some users felt that the procedure was simple enough but indicated that the tools
were hidden for an average user.
Many Advanced and expert users used advanced security methods such as adblocking and
made use of browser-based privacy configuration, incognito mode and third-party plugins. A
few expert level participants used VPN, Encryption, and DNS filtering. However, we note
that some self-reported advanced and expert users had a simplistic view of security, just like
intermediate users. The study required the participants to demonstrate if they knew and
used various Internet security mechanisms such as VPN and DNS privacy protocols. These
protocols, especially DNS, can easily be configured from the endpoint running almost all kinds
of operating systems and web browsers. All non-expert users indicated that they did not know
about VPN and DNS. Many advanced and expert users indicated that they only use security
and privacy services provided by their ISPs. Few expert users indicated awareness of DNS
privacy protocols such as DNS over TLS (DoT), DNS over HTTPS (DoH), and DNSSEC.
We expected that the results from the self-reported activities would translate into actual
practice in the configuration exercise. Surprisingly, we identified disparities between the partic-
ipants’ self-reported activities and the actual configuration through the task analysis activities.
For example, while participants indicated knowledge of the Internet configuration tools, a few
used them to configure security and privacy. Also, despite concerns over security and privacy
risks, only a few implemented correct and sufficient security measures to curb the risks. We also
noted that participants confused Internet security with device security by frequently referring
to antivirus, passwords, PINs and patterns. This is in contrast to the self-reported responses
where most participants indicated they knew Internet security configuration.
In summary, we observe relationships between computing skills, Internet security mental
models, and security preferences. The results suggest that in addition to cognitive biases re-
ported by Acquisti et al. [2], lack of sufficient security knowledge leads to distorted security
mental models which, in turn, leads to more flawed online security practice. Concurring with
prior research, this study also shows that while users have higher security needs, their actions
do not reflect those needs. For example, some participants felt they had all the security. Others
felt that they had nothing of interest to the attackers, while others were willing to give up on
their security and privacy to get free stuff from the Internet.
Relationship between technical knowledge, security mental models and security
practice We summarised our results through a relationship model (See Figure 10), which
describes the connections between the main themes in this study. In this model, the continu-
ous lines show strong relationships between the entities. In contrast, the dotted lines show a
weaker relationship between the entities. The arrows define the implication of the relationship.
Generally, the results show a strong relationship between the participants’ technical skills and
their Internet mental models (including the knowledge of online attacks). This agrees with the
findings by Kang et al. [23]. However, better Internet models do not always imply better secu-
rity mental models and online security practice, as revealed by the task analysis experiment.
For example, we found that some participants who had better Internet models exhibited a
distorted self vulnerability assessment. Both quantitative and qualitative studies do not show
significant differences in internet needs across computing skill levels.
Concurring with Kang et al. [23], we found that users either have a simple, moderate or
complete model of the Internet. The users with a complete model of the Internet generally
have matched security mental models and security practice. On the other hand, users with
moderate Internet models show moderate security mental models. Lastly, users with basic
mental models show basic security mental models. However, regardless of their Internet security
14 Mbewe, E.S., Chavula, J
Fig. 10: The relationship model between Internet user’s computing skills, metal models, self
vulnerability assessment and security preferences
mental models, most of the participants showed flawed security mental models leading to poor
online security practice. The results show that security preferences do not translate to good
security practice. Prior research calls this scenario a (security) privacy paradox. Our study finds
that apart from the cognitive biases that are known to cause the paradox, lack of sufficient
security attack vectors and security configuration knowledge is the leading cause of the flawed
mental models among Internet users.
5 Discussion
This study used multi-step mixed methods to identify users’ difficulties in interacting with
Internet security mechanisms and configuration tools. This approach provides a unique way
to identify hurdles and disparities in the participants’ security mental models. The usage of
drawing and configuration experiments aimed to triangulate the rich narrative of descriptive
and contextual data provided by surveys and interviews. The approach successfully enabled us
to pinpoint the source of hurdles and their respective impact on participants’ Internet security
practice.
Our results generally show a relationship between users’ technical knowledge, mental mod-
els, and security practice. However, we note flawed self vulnerability assessment and a mismatch
between users’ self-declared technical competence and security preferences and practice. Prior
research has tried to explain this disparity, especially in privacy and social economics research.
The two theories we relate to our findings are Privacy Paradox, a dichotomy between privacy
attitude and practice, [18], and Cognitive Biases, especially overconfidence, optimism bias, and
hyperbolic discounting [2].
Overconfidence and optimism bias are instances of incorrect estimates of subjective proba-
bilities [2]. People with optimism bias underestimate the chances that they might be subject to
an adverse event. On the other hand, overconfidence is an overestimation of one’s judgments.
The results show that some advanced and expert participants would be easy targets of online
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attacks due to cognitive biases. For example, one advanced user (P0035) indicated that he did
not think anyone could attack him. When followed up, he said, “I use a strong antivirus, and
I refrain from clicking unknown links.” This participant and other participants built their se-
curity mental models around antivirus software, heeding security warnings, and incognito web
browsing. Much as these are possible prevention measures, the participant did not realise that
attacks can be automated and come in different forms, such as social engineering, phishing,
and SMishing. Other participants thought they had nothing of interest to the attackers, while
others felt powerless to protect themselves. For example, one participant (P0050) said “I do
not think I have anything, apart from my banking app password, which the attackers can target
me for.” We further noted that some participants were willing to give up on their security
online to access “free” Internet resources. When asked about how the participants manage
personal information online or respond to security warnings, some participants indicated that
they decide based on the type of activity and weigh the benefits: “When my information is
required, I weigh the benefits. For example, if a website requests my information to download a
scarce book or movie, why not? I give it away. After all, my information is already in public.”
This is referred to as hyperbolic discounting in social economics literature [2], trading long-
term better benefits with short-lived rewards. Attackers exploit such human vulnerabilities to
launch attacks.
Interestingly, these participants indicated that they were very concerned about online secu-
rity and privacy breaches, reaffirming the Privacy Paradox theory, which attempts to explain
discrepancies between user attitude and their actual behaviour. Through task analysis, our
study aimed to establish the potential cause of such risky behaviours across different technical
skill levels. When compared to the Western-centric research on the topic, we note that the
Internet users in both the western world and Africa suffer from cognitive biases and overre-
liance on the service providers [5, 23, 32]. Peculiar to the African Internet users described in
this study, we find that lack of proper security orientation, including security protocols and
configuration frameworks, is the leading cause of poor Internet security mental models. Thus,
security remains a mystery to many users, which might be why humans are still considered
the weakest link in the security ecosystem.
We argue that the “stupid user” implementation of Internet security services has robed
users of their ability to learn and build proper security mental models. In particular, research
in this area argues that humans may not remember or may not be interested in the underlying
security protocols such as encryption, hash functions, among others. Through the findings of
this study, we argue that if Internet users are given the right tools, information and engagement,
it might be possible to change this narrative. We find that participants were comfortable
using passwords and antiviruses because they interact with these tools daily, and have become
inherent in Internet usage. Another good example could be taken from the security of physical
assets, which require personal responsibility. Over time, humans have built mental models
around it and can implement complex physical security systems.
We also observe that due to the paternalistic nature of Internet security implementation,
many users do not have these critical Internet security services in their Internet models. For
example, participants mentioned DNS, encryption and VPN fewer times across all the security
configuration activities than passwords and antivirus. This lack of awareness might allow DNS
attacks, for example, to succeed with less difficulty. The prevalent remote work enforced by
COVID-19, for example, requires personal security enforcement. However, most Internet users
are still not equipped to take personal responsibility for security online, allowing for cyberat-
tacks to succeed. More practical human-centred Internet security interventions are needed to
improve Internet security mental models.
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This study does not show a strong colleration between computing skills and internet needs.
However, we find that users would endeavour to protect some Internet transactions but not
others (see Figure 6). For example, some participants indicated they would sacrifice perfor-
mance to secure e-banking, communications, and identifying information.
In section 4.2, we presented a model showing the relationships among computing skills,
Internet mental models, security mental models and Internet security practice. In this model,
we show weak relationships between most of the entities. However, for complete protection
online, there is a need to have strong connections among the entities. Several interventions
have been proposed in recent years to improve the security landscape. One example is the
Security Configuration Management (SCM) tool [24]. SCM is defined as the management and
control of configurations for an information system to enable security and to manage risk.
Such tools are useful in corporations where a single point of control is possible. However, this
study shows that many participants used personal devices for Internet access. This suggests
that more personalised security configuration tools are needed to protect Internet users from
various attacks. One of such tools is personal DNS privacy configurators from Cloudflare 2,
AdGuard 3 and DNSCrypt 4. Much as these tools are effective, they focus on one aspect of
the security puzzle and mostly proprietary and expert-oriented.
This study calls for further research to reinforce users’ security mental models and improve
their security practice. We suggest data-driven security configuration models and personal se-
curity configuration tools. Such tools could combine various interventions responsible for edu-
cating, informing, feedback, and configuring security protocols on users’ devices. For example,
a data-driven approach would provide users with accurate information on the performance
cost of various protocols with an easy to use interface; and provide feedback and vulnerabil-
ity information to the user regardless of their technical background. The generated cues and
the properly framed nudges [2, 35] could help reinforce computing skills, mental models and
security practice.
6 Limitations
The potential limitation of this study lies in the language used to collect data and the type of
the participants. We used the English language only. This left out other potential participants
based on educational background and geographic region. Also, as described in the results
section, most of the participants had at least a bachelor’s degree working in ICT-related fields.
This skewness may affect the generalisation of the results. Nonetheless, we argue that our
findings provide an overview of users’ security mental models and their impact on users’ online
security practice. Future work could employ multi-lingual, expanded studies that consider
participants from all the African regions with diverse educational backgrounds.
7 Conclusion and future work
This study employed a mixed-methods approach to understand and investigate the relationship
between Internet users’ computing skill level, Internet security mental models, and security
practice. The study further aimed to establish the possible cause for Internet users’ distorted
security mental models. Our results show that computing skill levels significantly influence
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influence online security practice due to challenges that users experience when interacting
with Internet security configuration tools. Our study design, especially mental modelling and
task analysis methods, uniquely establishes that users’ poor security mental models are often
caused by insufficient Internet security knowledge. This lack of technical know-how for security
configuration is fueled by “stupid user” security implementation, which advocates for expert-
friendly security configuration tools. Our future work will explore how data-driven, user-centric
Internet security configuration framework would reinforce users’ security mental models and
improve their security practice.
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